The papers in this volume focus on two central issues in the philosophy of law, the relationship between law and morality, and crime and punishment. In the essay that gives the title to this volume, it is argued that, although in many legal systems there are in fact significant connections between law and morality, these connections are not conceptually or logically necessary. They depend on various social practices. Ronald Dworkin's famous attempt to undermine the legal positivist's separation of law from morality is rejected, and it is argued that Dworkin's own positive theory of law may indeed be quite compatible with certain versions of legal positivism. Other essays explore the notion of a wicked legal system, the rule of law, and various perspectives on the nature of law. The essays on crime and punishment discuss the theory and practice of punishment. They extend the work done in the author's earlier book, "Crime, Guilt and Punishment". They reject a purely retributive justification of punishment, in spite of the increasing sophistication in its recent formulations.